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ZERO-SUM RISK-SENSITIVE STOCHASTIC GAMES FOR
CONTINUOUS TIME MARKOV CHAINS
MRINAL K. GHOSH, K. SURESH KUMAR AND CHANDAN PAL
Abstract. We study infinite horizon discounted-cost and ergodic-cost
risk-sensitive zero-sum stochastic games for controlled continuous time
Markov chains on a countable state space. For the discounted-cost game
we prove the existence of value and saddle-point equilibrium in the class
of Markov strategies under nominal conditions. For the ergodic-cost
game we prove the existence of values and saddle point equilibrium
by studying the corresponding Hamilton-Jacobi-Isaacs equation under
a certain Lyapunov condition.
Key words: Risk-sensitive cost, infinite horizon discounted cost, infinite hori-
zon ergodic cost, HJI equation, value, saddle point equilibrium.
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1. Introduction
This paper is a sequel to [8] where the risk sensitive continuous time
Markov decision process is studied on a countable state space. In this pa-
per we extend the result of [8] to risk-sensitive zero sum stochastic games
for continuous time control Markov chains on a countable state space. A
zero-sum risk-sensitive differential game has been studied in [1] and the cor-
responding discrete time problem studied in [2]. As noted in [1] and [2], the
zero-sum risk-sensitive stochastic dynamic game is relevant in worst-case
scenarios, for example, in financial applications when a risk-averse investor
is trying to minimize his long-term portfolio loss against the market which,
by default, is antagonistic and hence the maximizer. As a result the mini-
mizer chooses the risk-aversion parameter θ > 0 and tries to minimizes his
expected risk-sensitive costs. Thus the risk-sensitive parameter is positive.
If θ < 0 then minimizer would be risk-seeking. The maximizer is not risk-
seeking but simply antagonistic to the minimizer. Under certain conditions
we establish value and saddle point strategies for both players.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 deals with the
description of the problem. In Section 3, we prove the existence of value and
saddle-point equilibrium in the class of Markov strategies for the discounted-
cost risk-sensitive zero-sum game. The analysis of ergodic-cost risk-sensitive
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zero-sum game is carried out in Section 4. The paper is concluded in Section
5 with some concluding remarks.
2. Problem Description
Let Ui, i = 1, 2, be compact metric space and Vi = P(Ui), space of prob-
ability measure on Ui with Prohorov topology. Let
U := U1 × U2 and V := V1 × V2.
Let π¯ij : U → [0,∞) for i 6= j and π¯ii : U → R for i ∈ S. Define πij : V → R
as follows: for v := (v1, v2) ∈ V ,
πij(v1, v2) =
∫
U2
∫
U1
π¯ij(u1, u2)v1(du1)v2(du2) :=
∫
U
π¯ij(u)v(du),
where u := (u1, u2) ∈ U .
We consider a continuous time controlled Markov chain Y (·) with state space
S = {1, 2, · · · } and controlled rate matrix Πv1,v2 = (πij(v1, v2)), given by the
stochastic integral
(2.1) dY (t) =
∫
R
h(Y (t−), v1(t), v2(t), z)℘(dzdt).
Here ℘(dzdt) is a Poisson random measure with intensity m(dz)dt, where
m(dz) denote the Lebesque measure on R. The control process v(·) :=
(v1(·), v2(·)) takes values in V , and h : S × V ×R→ R is defined as follows:
(2.2) h(i, v, z) =
{
j − i if z ∈ ∆ij(v)
0 otherwise,
where v := (v1, v2) and {∆ij(v) : i 6= j, i, j ∈ S} denote intervals of the form
[a, b) with length of ∆ij(v) = πij(v) which are pairwise disjoint for each
fixed v ∈ V .
If vi(t) = v¯i(t, Y (t−)) for some measurable map v¯i : [0,∞) × S → Vi, then
vi(·) is called a Markov strategy for the ith player. With an abuse of notation
the map v¯i itself is called a Markov strategy of player i. A Markov strategy
v¯i(·) is called a stationary strategy if the map v¯i does not depend explicitly
on time. We denote the set of all Markov strategies by Mi and set of all
stationary strategies by Si for the ith player.
Throughout this paper we assume that:
• π¯ij(u) ≥ 0 for all i 6= j, u ∈ U and the (infinite) matrix (π¯ij(u)) is
conservative, i.e.,∑
j∈S
π¯ij(u) = 0 for i ∈ S and u ∈ U .
• The function π¯ij are continuous and
sup
i∈S,u∈U
[−π¯ii(u)] :=M <∞ .
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The existence of a unique weak solution to the equation (2.1) for a pair of
Markov strategies (v1, v2) for a given initial distribution µ ∈ P(S) follows
using the above assumption, see [[6], Theorem 2.3, Theorem 2.5, pp.14-15].
Let r¯ : S × U1 × U2 → [0, ∞) be the running cost function. Throughout
this paper, we assume that the function r¯(·) is nonnegative, bounded and
continuous.
We list the commonly used notations below.
• Cb[a, b] denotes the set of all bounded and continuous functions on
[a, b].
• B(S) denotes the set of all bounded functions on S.
• C1(a, b) denotes the set of all continuously differentiable functions
on (a, b).
• C∞c (a, b) denotes the set of all infinitely differentiable functions on
(a, b) with compact support.
• Cb([a, b]×S) denotes the set of all functions f : [a, b]×S −→ R such
that f(t, i) ∈ Cb[a, b], for each i ∈ S.
• C1((a, b) × S) denotes the set of all functions f : (a, b) × S −→ R
such that f(t, i) ∈ C1(a, b), for each i ∈ S.
Set
BW (S) = {h : S → R| sup
i∈S
|h(i)|
W (i)
<∞},
where W is the Lyapunov function as in (A1) (to be described in Section
4). Define for h ∈ BW (S),
‖h‖W = sup
i∈S
|h(i)|
W (i)
.
Then BW (S) is a Banach space with the norm ‖ · ‖W .
2.1. Discounted Cost Criterion. For a pair of Markov strategies (v1, v2),
define α-discounted risk-sensitive cost by
(2.3) βv1,v2α (θ, i) =
1
θ
lnEv1,v2i
[
eθ
∫
∞
0
e−αtr(Y (t),v1(t,Y (t−)),v2(t,Y (t−)))dt
]
for some θ ∈ (0, Θ), and a fixed Θ > 0, α > 0 is the discount factor, Y (·) is
the Markov chain corresponding to (v1, v2) ∈M1 ×M2 with Y (0) = i, and
r : S × V → R+ is given by
r(i, v1, v2) =
∫
U2
∫
U1
r¯(i, u1, u2)v1(du1)v2(du2) :=
∫
U
r¯(i, u)v(du),
where u := (u1, u2) and v := (v1, v2).
Let θ ∈ (0,Θ) be the “risk-sensitive parameter” chosen by the minimizer.
When the state of the system is i and players 1,2, choose strategies v1 ∈ M1,
v2 ∈ M2 respectively, the minimizer (player 1) tries to minimize his infinite-
horizon discounted risk-sensitive cost βv1,v2α (θ, i) over his strategies whereas
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the maximizer (player 2) tries to maximize the same over his strategies.
A strategy v∗1 ∈ M1 is called optimal for player 1 for (θ, i) ∈ (0,Θ) × S, if
β
v∗
1
,v˜2
α (θ, i) ≤ sup
v2∈M2
inf
v1∈M1
βv1,v2α (θ, i) := β(α, θ, i) (lower value)
for any v˜2 ∈ M2. Similarly a strategy v
∗
2 ∈ M2 is called optimal for player
2 for (θ, i) ∈ (0,Θ) × S, if
β
v˜1,v∗2
α (θ, i) ≥ inf
v1∈M1
sup
v2∈M2
βv1,v2α (θ, i) := β(α, θ, i) (upper value)
for any v˜1 ∈ M1. The game has value if
(2.4) β(α, θ, i) = β(α, θ, i) = β(α, θ, i) ∀ i ∈ S,∀ θ ∈ (0,Θ).
A pair of strategies (v∗1 , v
∗
2) at which this value is attained is called a saddle-
point equilibrium, and then v∗1 is optimal for player 1, and v
∗
2 is optimal for
player 2.
2.2. Ergodic Cost Criterion. For a pair of Markov strategies (v1, v2), the
risk-sensitive ergodic cost is given by
(2.5) ρv1,v2(θ, i) = lim sup
T→∞
1
θT
lnEv1,v2i
[
eθ
∫
T
0
r(Y (t),v1(t,Y (t−)),v2(t,Y (t−)))dt
]
,
for some θ ∈ (0, Θ), and a fixed Θ > 0, Y (·) is the Markov chain corre-
sponding to (v1, v2) ∈ M1 ×M2 with Y (0) = i.
Optimal strategies, saddle point equilibrium, etc. for this criterion are
defined analogously. The ergodic cost ρv1,v2 may depend on (θ, i).
3. Analysis of Discounted Cost Criterion
We carry out our analysis of the discounted cost criterion via the criterion
(3.1) ξv1,v2α (θ, i) = E
v1,v2
i
[
eθ
∫
∞
0
e−αtr(Y (t),v1(t,Y (t−)),v2(t,Y (t−)))dt
]
.
Since logarithmic is an increasing function, therefore the optimal strategies
for the criterion (2.3) are optimal strategies for the above criterion.
Corresponding to the cost criterion (3.1), the value function is defined as
ψα(θ, i) = inf
v1∈M1
sup
v2∈M2
ξv1,v2α (θ, i)
and
ψ
α
(θ, i) = sup
v2∈M2
inf
v1∈M1
ξv1,v2α (θ, i).
Using dynamic programming heuristics, the Hamilton-Jacobi-Isaacs (HJI)
equations for discounted cost criterion are given by
αθ
dψα
dθ
(θ, i) = inf
v1∈V1
sup
v2∈V2
[
Πv1,v2ψα(θ, i) + θr(i, v1, v2)ψα(θ, i)
]
= sup
v2∈V2
inf
v1∈V1
[
Πv1,v2ψα(θ, i) + θr(i, v1, v2)ψα(θ, i)
]
ψα(0, i) = 1,(3.2)
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where Πv1,v2f(i) :=
∑
j∈S
πij(v1, v2)f(j), for any function f(i).
Next we prove that the equations (3.2) have a smooth, bounded solution.
Fix ǫ > 0 and consider the ordinary differential equation (ODE)
αθ
dψǫα
dθ
(θ, i) = inf
v1∈V1
sup
v2∈V2
[
Πv1,v2ψ
ǫ
α(θ, i) + θr(i, v1, v2)ψ
ǫ
α(θ, i)
]
= sup
v2∈V2
inf
v1∈V1
[
Πv1,v2ψ
ǫ
α(θ, i) + θr(i, v1, v2)ψ
ǫ
α(θ, i)
]
(3.3)
ψǫα(ǫ, i) = e
ǫ
α
‖r‖∞ := hǫ,
where ‖ · ‖∞ denotes the supnorm. Note that the second equality follows
from Fan’s minimax theorem, see [[4], Theorem 3].
Let δ > 0. Define the nonlinear operator T : Cb([ǫ, ǫ + δ] × S) → Cb([ǫ, ǫ +
δ]× S) by
Tf(η, i) := e
ǫ
α
‖r‖∞ +
1
α
∫ η
ǫ
inf
v1∈V1
sup
v2∈V2
[1
θ
Πv1,v2f(θ, i) + r(i, v1, v2)f(θ, i)
]
dθ.
By using the fact sup
i∈S,u∈U
[−π¯ii(u)] =M <∞ and r is bounded, we have
‖Tf1 − Tf2‖∞ ≤
1
α
[
‖r‖∞δ + 2M ln
(
1 +
δ
ǫ
)]
‖f1 − f2‖∞.
Choose δ such that 1α
[
‖r‖∞δ+2M ln
(
1+ δǫ
)]
< 1. Then T is a contraction
operator. Therefore by Banach’s fixed point theorem there exists a function
ψǫα ∈ Cb([ǫ, ǫ+ δ]× S) such that
ψǫα(η, i) = e
ǫ
α
‖r‖∞+
1
α
∫ η
ǫ
inf
v1∈V1
sup
v2∈V2
[1
θ
Πv1,v2ψ
ǫ
α(θ, i)+r(i, v1, v2)ψ
ǫ
α(θ, i)
]
dθ.
Note that the bracketed term in the above integrand is bounded and jointly
continuous in (θ, v1, v2). Since V1 and V2 are compact metric spaces, it
follows that the integrand above is bounded and continuous in θ ∈ [ǫ, ǫ+ δ].
Thus it follows that ψǫα is in C
1((ǫ, ǫ+ δ]×S)∩Cb([ǫ, ǫ+ δ]×S). Proceeding
in this way we get a C1((ǫ,Θ) × S) ∩ Cb([ǫ,Θ) × S) solution for the ODE
(3.3). Let
v¯i : (0,Θ)× S → Vi, i = 1, 2,
be measurable functions such that
inf
v1∈V1
sup
v2∈V2
[
Πv1,v2ψ
ǫ
α(θ, i) + θr(i, v1, v2)ψ
ǫ
α(θ, i)
]
= sup
v2∈V2
[
Πv¯1,v2ψ
ǫ
α(θ, i) + θr(i, v¯1(θ, i), v2)ψ
ǫ
α(θ, i)
]
(3.4)
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and
sup
v2∈V2
inf
v1∈V1
[
Πv1,v2ψ
ǫ
α(θ, i) + θr(i, v1, v2)ψ
ǫ
α(θ, i)
]
= inf
v1∈V1
[
Πv1,v¯2ψ
ǫ
α(θ, i) + θr(i, , v1, v¯2(θ, i))ψ
ǫ
α(θ, i)
]
.(3.5)
The existence of such measurable maps are ensured by Benesˇ measurable
selection theorem, see [3]. Let
v∗i : R+ × S → Vi, i = 1, 2,
be defined by
v∗i (t, i) = v¯i(θe
−αt, i), i = 1, 2.
Set θ(t) = θe−αt and define Tǫ by
Tǫ = inf{t ≥ 0 : θ(t) = ǫ}.
For (v∗1 , v2) ∈ M1 ×M2, applying Itoˆ formula (see [6], Appendix C, pp.
218-219) to the function
e
∫
t
0
θ(s)r(Y (s),v∗
1
(s,Y (s−)),v2(s,Y (s−)))dsψǫα(θ(t), Y (t)),
we obtain
E
v1,v2
i [e
∫
Tǫ
0
θ(s)r(Y (s),v∗
1
(s,Y (s−)),v2(s,Y (s−)))dsψǫα(θ(Tǫ), Y (Tǫ))]− ψ
ǫ
α(θ, i)
= Ev1,v2i
[ ∫ Tǫ
0
e
∫
t
0
θ(s)r(Y (s),v∗
1
(s,Y (s−)),v2(s,Y (s−)))ds
{
− αθ(t)
dψǫα
dθ
(θ(t), Y (t))
+Πv1,v2ψ
ǫ
α(θ(t), Y (t)) + θ(t)r(Y (t), v
∗
1(t, Y (t−)), v2(t, Y (t−)))ψ
ǫ
α(θ(t), Y (t))
}
dt
]
.
Since ψǫα satisfies (3.4), we obtain
E
v∗1 ,v2
i [e
∫
Tǫ
0
θ(s)r(Y (s),v∗
1
(s,Y (s−)),v2(s,Y (s−)))dshǫ]− ψ
ǫ
α(θ, i) ≤ 0,
where hǫ is as in (3.3). Since v2 is arbitrary, we get
ψǫα(θ, i) ≥ sup
v2∈M2
E
v∗
1
,v2
i
[
hǫe
∫
Tǫ
0
θ(s)r(Y (s),v∗1 (s,Y (s−)),v2(s,Y (s−)))ds
]
.(3.6)
Using analogous arguments, we can show that
ψǫα(θ, i) ≤ inf
v1∈M1
E
v1,v∗2
i
[
hǫe
∫
Tǫ
0
θ(s)r(Y (s),v1(s,Y (s−)),v∗2 (s,Y (s−)))ds
]
.(3.7)
Therefore, from (3.6) and (3.7), we obtain
ψǫα(θ, i) = sup
v2∈M2
inf
v1∈M1
E
v1,v2
i
[
hǫe
∫
Tǫ
0
θ(s)r(Y (s),v1(s,Y (s−)),v2(s,Y (s−)))ds
]
= inf
v1∈M1
sup
v2∈M2
E
v1,v2
i
[
hǫe
∫
Tǫ
0
θ(s)r(Y (s),v1(s,Y (s−)),v2(s,Y (s−)))ds
]
.(3.8)
Next we take limit of ψǫα as ǫ→ 0 and prove that the limit function satisfies
(3.2), i.e., we prove the following theorem.
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Theorem 3.1. There exists a unique solution ψα in the class Cb((0,Θ) ×
S)∩C1((0,Θ)×S) to (3.2). The solution admits the following representation
ψα(θ, i) = sup
v2∈M2
inf
v1∈M1
E
v1,v2
i
[
eθ
∫
∞
0
e−αsr(Y (s),v1(s,Y (s−)),v2(s,Y (s−)))ds
]
= inf
v1∈M1
sup
v2∈M2
E
v1,v2
i
[
eθ
∫
∞
0
e−αsr(Y (s),v1(s,Y (s−)),v2(s,Y (s−)))ds
]
.
Furthermore ψα is the value function for the discounted cost criterion (3.1).
Moreover, a saddle point equilibrium exists in M1 ×M2.
Proof. First recall the stochastic representation of ψǫα from (3.8),
ψǫα(θ, i) = sup
v2∈M2
inf
v1∈M1
E
v1,v2
i
[
hǫe
∫
Tǫ
0
θ(s)r(Y (s),v1(s,Y (s−)),v2(s,Y (s−)))ds
]
= inf
v1∈M1
sup
v2∈M2
E
v1,v2
i
[
hǫe
∫
Tǫ
0
θ(s)r(Y (s),v1(s,Y (s−)),v2(s,Y (s−)))ds
]
.
From the representation of ψǫα, we have
1 ≤ ψǫα(θ, i) ≤ hǫe
θ
α
‖r‖∞(1−e−αTǫ ) = e
θ
α
‖r‖∞
for every ǫ > 0, and all (θ, i).
By closely mimicking the arguments in the proof of [[5], Theorem 3.4], it fol-
lows that the HJB equation (3.2) has a solution in Cb((0,Θ)×S)∩C
1((0,Θ)×
S). Let
v¯i : (0,Θ)× S → Vi, i = 1, 2,
be measurable selectors such that
inf
v1∈V1
sup
v2∈V2
[
Πv1,v2ψα(θ, i) + θr(i, v1, v2)ψα(θ, i)
]
= sup
v2∈V2
[
Πv¯1,v2ψα(θ, i) + θr(i, v¯1(θ, i), v2)ψα(θ, i)
]
(3.9)
and
sup
v2∈V2
inf
v1∈V1
[
Πv1,v2ψα(θ, i) + θr(i, v1, v2)ψα(θ, i)
]
= inf
v1∈V1
[
Πv1,v¯2ψα(θ, i) + θr(i, , v1, v¯2(θ, i))ψα(θ, i)
]
.(3.10)
Let
v∗i : R+ × S → Vi, i = 1, 2,
be defined by
(3.11) v∗i (t, i) = v¯i(θe
−αt, i), i = 1, 2.
For (v∗1 , v2) ∈ M1 ×M2, applying Itoˆ formula to the function
e
∫
t
0
θ(s)r(Y (s),v∗
1
(s,Y (s−)),v2(s,Y (s−)))dsψα(θ(t), Y (t))
and using (3.9), we get
E
v∗1 ,v2
i [e
∫
T
0
θ(s)r(Y (s),v∗
1
(s,Y (s−)),v2(s,Y (s−)))dsψα(θ(T ), Y (T ))]− ψα(θ, i) ≤ 0.
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Since v2 is arbitrary, we get
ψα(θ, i) ≥ sup
v2∈M2
E
v∗
1
,v2
i
[
ψα(θ(T ), Y (T ))e
∫
T
0
θ(s)r(Y (s),v∗
1
(s,Y (s−)),v2(s,Y (s−)))ds
]
.
Since 1 ≤ ψ¯ǫα ≤ e
θ
α
‖r‖∞ for all ǫ > 0, we get
ψα(θ, i) ≥ sup
v2∈M2
E
v∗
1
,v2
i
[
e
∫
T
0
θ(s)r(Y (s),v∗
1
(s,Y (s−)),v2(s,Y (s−)))ds
]
.
By using monotone convergence theorem for letting T →∞ in the above we
obtain
ψα(θ, i) ≥ sup
v2∈M2
E
v∗
1
,v2
i
[
e
∫
∞
0
θ(s)r(Y (s),v∗1 (s,Y (s−)),v2(s,Y (s−)))ds
]
.(3.12)
Using analogous arguments we can show that
ψα(θ, i) ≤ inf
v1∈M1
E
v1,v∗2
i
[
e
∫
∞
0
θ(s)r(Y (s),v1(s,Y (s−)),v∗2 (s,Y (s−)))ds
]
.(3.13)
Therefore, from (3.12) and (3.13), we obtain
ψα(θ, i) = sup
v2∈M2
inf
v1∈M1
E
v1,v2
i
[
e
∫
∞
0
θ(s)r(Y (s),v1(s,Y (s−)),v2(s,Y (s−)))ds
]
= inf
v1∈M1
sup
v2∈M2
E
v1,v2
i
[
e
∫
∞
0
θ(s)r(Y (s),v1(s,Y (s−)),v2(s,Y (s−)))ds
]
.
It is easy to check that ψα is the value function for the discounted cost
criterion (3.1). Moreover, the pair of Markov strategies given by (3.11)
forms a saddle point equilibrium. This completes the proof. 
4. Analysis of Ergodic Cost Criterion
In this section we prove the existence of value and stationary Markov
saddle point strategies for the ergodic cost criterion under the following
assumption:
(A1)(Lyapunov condition) There exist constants b > 0, δ > 0, a finite set
C and a map W : S → [1,∞) with W (i)→∞ as i→∞, such that
ΠvW (i) ≤ −2δW (i) + bIC(i), i ∈ S, v ∈ V.
Throughout this section, we assume that for every pair of stationary
Markov strategies (v1, v2) the corresponding Markov chain is irreducible.
We carry out our analysis of the ergodic cost criterion as a limit of the
corresponding finite horizon cost criterion given by
(4.1) IT (i, v1, v2) := E
v1,v2
i
[
e
∫
T
0
r(Y (s),v1(s,Y (s−)),v2(s,Y (s−)))ds
]
where Y (·) is the Markov chain corresponding to (v1, v2) ∈ M1 ×M2 with
initial condition i ∈ S. Using the dynamic programming heuristics, the HJI
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equations for the above cost criterion, are given by
−
dφ
dt
(t, i) = inf
v1∈V1
sup
v2∈V2
[
Πv1,v2φ(t, i) + r(i, v1, v2)φ(t, i)
]
= sup
v2∈V2
inf
v1∈V1
[
Πv1,v2φ(t, i) + r(i, v1, v2)φ(t, i)
]
φ(T, i) = 1.(4.2)
As before, we can show the existence of a C1((0, T ) × S) ∩ Cb([0, T ] × S)
solution for the ODE (4.2). Using a standard application of Itoˆ’s formula
we get
φ(t, i) = sup
v2∈M2
inf
v1∈M1
E
v1,v2
i
[
e
∫
T
t
r(Y (s),v1(s,Y (s−)),v2(s,Y (s−)))ds
]
= inf
v1∈M1
sup
v2∈M2
E
v1,v2
i
[
e
∫
T
t
r(Y (s),v1(s,Y (s−)),v2(s,Y (s−)))ds
]
.
Set ψ(t, i) = φ(T − t, i). Then ψ is the unique C1((0, T )×S)∩Cb([0, T ]×S)
solution to
dψ
dt
(t, i) = inf
v1∈V1
sup
v2∈V2
[
Πv1,v2ψ(t, i) + r(i, v1, v2)ψ(t, i)
]
= sup
v2∈V2
inf
v1∈V1
[
Πv1,v2ψ(t, i) + r(i, v1, v2)ψ(t, i)
]
ψ(0, i) = 1.
Using Itoˆ’s formula, we obtain
ψ(t, i) = sup
v2∈M2
inf
v1∈M1
E
v1,v2
i
[
e
∫
t
0
r(Y (s),v1(s,Y (s−)),v2(s,Y (s−)))ds
]
= inf
v1∈M1
sup
v2∈M2
E
v1,v2
i
[
e
∫
t
0
r(Y (s),v1(s,Y (s−)),v2(s,Y (s−)))ds
]
.
Formally, using separation of variables, we write
ψ(t, i) = eρtψˆ(i).
This yields
ρ ψˆ(i) = inf
v1∈V1
sup
v2∈V2
[
Πv1,v2ψˆ(i) + r(i, v1, v2)ψˆ(i)
]
= sup
v2∈V2
inf
v1∈V1
[
Πv1,v2ψˆ(i) + r(i, v1, v2)ψˆ(i)
]
.(4.3)
The above equation is the HJI equation for the ergodic cost (2.5).
We now proceed to make a rigorous analysis of the above. First we trun-
cate our cost function which plays a crucial role to derive the HJI equations
and find the value of the game. Let rn : S × V → [0, ∞) be given by
(4.4) rn :=
{
r if i ∈ {1, 2, · · · , n}
0 otherwise
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and
ψn(t, i) = sup
v2∈M2
inf
v1∈M1
E
v1,v2
i
[
e
∫
t
0
rn(Y (s),v1(s,Y (s−)),v2(s,Y (s−)))ds
]
= inf
v1∈M1
sup
v2∈M2
E
v1,v2
i
[
e
∫
t
0
rn(Y (s),v1(s,Y (s−)),v2(s,Y (s−)))ds
]
.
Then, as above, we can show that ψn is the unique solution in C1((0, T ) ×
S) ∩ Cb([0, T ] × S) to
dψn
dt
(t, i) = inf
v1∈V1
sup
v2∈V2
[
Πv1,v2ψ
n(t, i) + rn(i, v1, v2)ψn(t, i)
]
= sup
v2∈V2
inf
v1∈V1
[
Πv1,v2ψ
n(t, i) + rn(i, v1, v2)ψ
n(t, i)
]
ψn(0, i) = 1.
Now onward, we fix a reference state i0 ∈ S such that W (i0) ≥ 1 +
b
δ and
set
(4.5) ψ¯n(t, i) =
ψn(t, i)
ψn(t, i0)
.
Then it is easy to see that ψ¯n is the unique solution in C1((0, T ) × S) ∩
Cb([0, T ] × S) to
dψ¯n
dt
(t, i) +
ψ¯n(t, i)
ψn(t, i0)
dψn
dt
(t, i0) = inf
v1∈V1
sup
v2∈V2
[
Πv1,v2ψ¯
n(t, i) + rn(i, v1, v2)ψ¯
n(t, i)
]
= sup
v2∈V2
inf
v1∈V1
[
Πv1,v2ψ¯
n(t, i) + rn(i, v1, v2)ψ¯
n(t, i)
]
ψ¯n(0, i) = 1.(4.6)
Next we take limit as t → ∞ in (4.6), to derive the existence of a solution
for ergodic HJI equation with cost function rn. For this we want to show
that ψ¯n(t, i) is uniformly bounded (for each fixed n ). To this end fix a
strategy of player 2 and consider the corresponding optimal control problem
for player 1 .
Let v∗2n : R+ × S → V2 be a measurable map such that
inf
v1∈V1
sup
v2∈V2
[
Πv1,v2ψ
n(t, i) + rn(i, v1, v2)ψ
n(t, i)
]
= inf
v1∈V1
[
Πv1,v∗2n(t,i)ψ
n(t, i) + rn(i, v1, v
∗
2n(t, i))ψ
n(t, i)
]
.
We suppress the dependence of n on v∗2n and write v
∗
2 instead.
For the fixed Markov strategy v∗2 ∈M2 consider the pure jump processes
given by
(4.7) dYv∗
2
(t) =
∫
R
h(Yv∗
2
(t−), v1(t), v
∗
2(t, Yv∗2 (t−)), z)℘(dzdt),
where h is as in (2.2).
Now we consider a new auxiliary continuous time Markov decision problem
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(CTMDP) corresponding to the process (4.7), i.e., player 2 fixes the strategy
v∗2 and player 1 treats it as a CTMDP. First we define the set of all admissible
controls denoted by A.
A V1-valued process v1(·) is said to be admissible if it is predictable and
the equation
(4.8) dYv∗
2
(t) =
∫
R
h(Yv∗
2
(t−), v1(t), v
∗
2(t, Yv∗2 (t−)), z)℘(dzdt)
has a unique weak solution for each initial Y0 independent of ℘(dzdt).
For an admissible control v1(·) ∈ A, the risk-sensitive cost for the finite
horizon [0,T] is defined by
Inv∗
2
(i, v1(·)) = E
v1,v∗2
i
[
e
∫
T
0
rn(Yv∗
2
(t),v1(t),v∗2 (t,Yv∗
2
(t−)))dt
]
,
where Yv∗
2
(·) is the pure jump process (4.8) corresponding to v1(·) and initial
condition i ∈ S.
Consider the ODE
−
dΨnv∗
2
dt
(t, i) = inf
v1∈V1
[
Πv1,v∗2(t,i)Ψ
n
v∗
2
(t, i) + rn(i, v1, v
∗
2(t, i))Ψ
n
v∗
2
(t, i)
]
Ψnv∗
2
(T, i) = 1.(4.9)
Define the nonlinear operator T : Cb([0, T ] × S)→ Cb([0, T ] × S) by
T f(t, i) := 1 +
∫ T
t
inf
v1∈V1
[
Πv1,v∗2 (t,i)f(s, i) + rn(i, v1, v
∗
2(t, i))f(s, i)
]
ds.
As before, we get the existence of a solution to (4.9) in Cb([0, T ]×S). Using
a standard application of Itoˆ’s formula, we obtain
Ψnv∗
2
(t, i) = inf
v1(·)∈A
E
v1,v∗2
i
[
e
∫
T
t
rn(Yv∗
2
(s),v1(s,Yv∗
2
(s−)),v∗
2
(s,Yv∗
2
(s−)))ds
]
.
Set ψnv∗
2
(t, i) = Ψnv∗
2
(T−t, i). Then ψnv∗
2
is the unique solution in Cb([0, T ]×S)
to
dψnv∗
2
dt
(t, i) = inf
v1∈V1
[
Πv1,v∗2 (t,i)ψ
n
v∗
2
(t, i) + rn(i, v1, v
∗
2(t, i))ψ
n
v∗
2
(t, i)
]
ψv∗
2
(0, i) = 1.(4.10)
Using Itoˆ’s formula, we obtain
ψnv∗
2
(t, i) = inf
v1(·)∈A
E
v1,v∗2
i
[
e
∫
t
0
rn(Yv∗
2
(s),v1(s),v∗2 (s,Yv∗
2
(s−)))ds
]
.
It is easy to see that any minimizing selector in (4.10) corresponding to ψnv∗
2
is optimal for the finite horizon CTMDP for player 1. Since any minimizing
selector corresponds to a Markov control, we have
ψnv∗
2
(t, i) = inf
v1∈M1
E
v1,v∗2
i
[
e
∫
t
0
rn(Yv∗
2
(s),v1(s,Yv∗
2
(s−)),v∗2 (s,Yv∗
2
(s−)))ds
]
.
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For the reference state i0 ∈ S, we define
ψ¯nv∗
2
(t, i) =
ψnv∗
2
(t, i)
ψnv∗
2
(t, i0)
.
A simple calculation shows that ψ¯nv∗
2
= ψ¯n, where ψ¯n is as in (4.5).
By closely mimicking the arguments in [[7], Theorem 3.1], one can easily
get the following multiplicative DPP; we omit the details.
Theorem 4.1. For any set S˜ ⊆ S,
ψnv∗
2
(t, i) = inf
v1(·)∈A
E
v1,v∗2
i
[
e
∫
t∧τ
0
rn(Yv∗
2
(s),v1(s),v∗2 (s,Yv∗
2
(s−)))ds
ψnv∗
2
(t−(t∧τ), Yv∗
2
(t∧τ))
]
, t ≥ 0 ,
where τ is the hitting time of the process Yv∗
2
(·) to the set S˜.
Using the similar arguments as in the proofs of [8], we can prove the
following results; we omit the details.
Lemma 4.1. Assume (A1). Let Y (·) be a process (2.1) corresponding to
(v1, v
∗
2) ∈ M1 ×M2. Then
E
v1,v∗2
i
[
eδτi0
]
≤ W (i), i ∈ S,
where τi0 = inf{t ≥ 0 : Y (t) = i0}.
Lemma 4.2. Assume (A1) and ‖r‖∞ ≤ δ, where δ > 0 is given in (A1).
Then
|ψ¯nv∗
2
(t, i)| ≤ W (i), t ≥ 0, i ∈ S.
Lemma 4.3. Assume (A1) and ‖r‖∞ ≤ δ, where δ > 0 is given in (A1).
Then
sup
t>0,i∈S
‖ψ¯nv∗
2
(t, i)‖∞ <∞.
Proof. Let i ≥ n+ 1 and Yv∗
2
(·) be the solution corresponding to vˆ(·) ∈ M1
with initial condition i. Then from Theorem 4.1, we have
ψnv∗
2
(t, i) ≤ E
vˆ,v∗
2
i
[
e
∫
t∧τ
0
rn(Yv∗
2
(s),vˆ(s,Yv∗
2
(s)),v∗
2
(s,Yv∗
2
(s)))ds
ψnv∗
2
(t− (t ∧ τ), Yv∗
2
(t ∧ τ))
]
,
= E
vˆ,v∗2
i
[
ψnv∗
2
(t− (t ∧ τ), Yv∗
2
(t ∧ τ))I{t ≤ τ}
]
+E
vˆ,v∗
2
i
[
ψnv∗
2
(t− (t ∧ τ), Yv∗
2
(t ∧ τ))I{t > τ}
]
= E
vˆ,v∗2
i
[
ψnv∗
2
(0, Yv∗
2
(t))I{t ≤ τ}
]
+E
vˆ,v∗
2
i
[
ψnv∗
2
(t− τ, Yv∗
2
(τ))I{t > τ}
]
≤ 1+E
vˆ,v∗
2
i
[
ψnv∗
2
(t, Yv∗
2
(τ))I{t > τ}
]
,
where
τ = inf{t ≥ 0 : Yv∗
2
(t) ∈ {1, 2, · · · , n}}.
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In the last inequality we used the fact that ψnv∗
2
(·, i) is nondecreasing in t
for each fixed i. Hence
ψ¯nv∗
2
(t, i) ≤ 1 + max
j=1,...,n
ψ¯nv∗
2
(t, j) ≤ 1 + max
j=1,...,n
W (j)
since ψnv∗
2
(t, i0) ≥ 1 and last inequality follows from Lemma 4.2. Therefore
for each n ≥ 1, ψ¯nv∗
2
is bounded. 
Remark 4.1. From Lemma 4.3, it follows that for each n, ψ¯nv∗
2
is uniformly
bounded (in t and i) and that bound is independent of the v∗2. Therefore, we
conclude that for each n, ψ¯n is also uniformly bounded (in t and i), since
ψ¯nv∗
2
= ψ¯n.
Lemma 4.4. Assume (A1) and ‖r‖∞ ≤ δ, where δ > 0 is given in (A1).
Then
sup
t≥0
∥∥∥ 1
ψn(t, i0)
dψn
dt
(t, ·)
∥∥∥
W
<∞.
Proof. Note that
1
ψn(t, i0)
dψn
dt
(t, i) =
dψ¯n
dt
(t, i) +
ψ¯n(t, i)
ψn(t, i0)
dψn
dt
(t, i0)
= inf
v1∈V1
sup
v2∈V2
[
Πv1,v2ψ¯
n(t, i) + rn(i, v1, v2)ψ¯
n(t, i)
]
= sup
v2∈V2
inf
v1∈V1
[
Πv1,v2ψ¯
n(t, i) + rn(i, v1, v2)ψ¯
n(t, i)
]
.
The second equality follows from (4.6). Now the result follows from the fact
sup
i∈S,u∈U
[−π¯ii(u)] =M <∞
and Remark 4.1. 
Now we prove the existence of a solution to the HJI equation for the cost
function rn.
Theorem 4.2. Assume (A1) and ‖r‖∞ ≤ δ, where δ > 0 is given in (A1).
Then the equation
ρn ψˆn(i) = inf
v1∈V1
sup
v2∈V2
[
Πv1,v2ψˆ
n(i) + rn(i, v1, v2)ψˆ
n(i)
]
= sup
v2∈V2
inf
v1∈V1
[
Πv1,v2ψˆ
n(i) + rn(i, v1, v2)ψˆ
n(i)
]
(4.11)
has a solution (ρn, ψˆn(i)) satisfying ψˆn(i0) = 1. Also
(4.12)
ρn ≤ sup
v2∈M2
inf
v1∈M1
lim sup
T→∞
1
T
lnEv1,v2i
[
e
∫
T
0
r(Y (s),v1(s,Y (s−)),v2(s,Y (s−)))ds
]
and
(4.13) 0 < ψˆn(i) ≤W (i), n ≥ 1, i ∈ S.
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Proof. Using mean value theorem and Remark 4.1, there exists s(t, i) ∈
[t, 2t], t > 0 such that
lim
t→∞
dψ¯n
dt
(s(t, i), i) = 0 .
By Lemma 4.2, we have
sup
t≥0
|ψ¯n(s(t, i), i)| ≤W (i).
Using a diagonalization argument, along a subsequence, ψ¯n(s(t, i), i) →
ψˆn(i), for each i ∈ S for some ψˆn ∈ BW (S).
By Lemma 4.4, we have
sup
t≥0
|
1
ψn(s(t, i), i0)
dψn
dt
(s(t, i), i0)| <∞.
Therefore, along a further subsequence denoted by the same notation by an
abuse of notation, we have
1
ψn(s(t, i), i0)
dψn
dt
(s(t, i), i0)→ ρ
n, for some ρn ∈ R.
Hence, along a suitable subsequence, we have
dψ¯n
dt
(s(t, i), i) +
ψ¯n(s(t, i), i)
ψn(s(t, i), i0)
dψn
dt
(s(t, i), i0)→ ψˆ
n(i)ρn.
By letting t → ∞ in (4.6) at t = s(t, i) along a suitable subsequence, and
using (A1) it follows that (ρn, ψˆn(i)) is a solution to the equation (4.11)
satisfying ψˆn(i0) = 1.
Let v∗n = (v
∗
1n, v
∗
2n) : S → V be a min-max selector such that
sup
v2∈V2
[
Πv∗
1n
(i),v2 ψˆ
n(i) + rn(i, v
∗
1n(i), v2)ψˆ
n(i)
]
= inf
v1∈V1
sup
v2∈V2
[
Πv1,v2ψˆ
n(i) + rn(i, v1, v2)ψˆ
n(i)
]
= sup
v2∈V2
inf
v1∈V1
[
Πv1,v2ψˆ
n(i) + rn(i, v1, v2)ψˆ
n(i)
]
= inf
v1∈V1
[
Πv1,v∗2n(i)ψˆ
n(i) + rn(i, v1, v
∗
2n(i))ψˆ
n(i)
]
(4.14)
For vn := (v1, v
∗
2n) ∈ M1 ×M2, let Y (·) be the process (4.8) corresponding
to vn with initial condition i ∈ S. Then using Itoˆ-Dynkin’s formula and
(4.14), we get
E
v1,v∗2n
i
[
e
∫
T
0
(rn(Y (s),v1(s,Y (s−)),v∗2n(s,Y (s−)))−ρn)dsψˆn(Y (T ))
]
− ψˆn(i) ≥ 0.
From Remark 4.1 it follows that for each n, ψˆn is bounded. Therefore we
have
ψˆn(i) ≤ K(n)E
v1,v∗2n
i
[
e
∫
T
0
(rn(Y (s),v1(s,Y (s−)),v∗2n(s,Y (s−)))−ρn)ds
]
.
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Taking logarithm, dividing by T and by letting T →∞, we get
ρn ≤ lim sup
T→∞
1
T
lnE
v1,v∗2n
i
[
e
∫
T
0
rn(Y (s),v1(s,Y (s−)),v∗2n(s,Y (s−)))ds
]
.
Since v1 ∈ M1 is arbitrary, it follows that
ρn ≤ inf
v1∈M1
lim sup
T→∞
1
T
lnE
v1,v∗2n
i
[
e
∫
T
0
rn(Y (s),v1(s,Y (s−)),v∗2n(s,Y (s−)))ds
]
.
Therefore we have
ρn ≤ sup
v2∈M2
inf
v1∈M1
lim sup
T→∞
1
T
lnEv1,v2i
[
e
∫
T
0
rn(Y (s),v1(s,Y (s−)),v2(s,Y (s−)))ds
]
.
Since rn ≤ r, we have
ρn ≤ sup
v2∈M2
inf
v1∈M1
lim sup
T→∞
1
T
lnEv1,v2i
[
e
∫
T
0
r(Y (s),v1(s,Y (s−)),v2(s,Y (s−)))ds
]
.

Now by using Theorem 4.2, one can closely mimic the arguments in the
proof of [[8], Theorem 3.3] to prove the following.
Theorem 4.3. Assume (A1) and ‖r‖∞ ≤ δ, where δ > 0 is given in (A1).
Then the equation (4.3) has a solution (ρ, ψˆ(i)) satisfying ψˆ(i0) = 1. Also
(4.15)
ρ ≤ sup
v2∈M2
inf
v1∈M1
lim sup
T→∞
1
T
lnEv1,v2i
[
e
∫
T
0
r(Y (s),v1(s,Y (s−)),v2(s,Y (s−)))ds
]
.
To prove that the ρ in Theorem 4.3 is indeed the value of the game. We
used the atomic structure of the state dynamics, as in [8]. Let v∗1 ∈ S1 be
the outer minimizing selector in (4.3) for player 1, v2 ∈ M2 any strategy for
player 2 and let Y (·) be a continuous time Markov chain corresponding to
(v∗1 , v2) ∈ S1 ×M2.
Define the twisted kernel P˜ (j, i) associated with Y (·) and r as follows.
(4.16)∑
j∈S
h(j)P˜ (j, i) =
E
v∗1 ,v2
i [e
∫ 1
0
r(Y (s),v∗
1
(Y (s−)),v2(s,Y (s−)))dsh(Y (1))]
E
v∗
1
,v2
i [e
∫ 1
0
r(Y (s),v∗
1
(Y (s−)),v2(s,Y (s−)))ds]
, i ∈ S, h ∈ B(S).
Set
erˆ(i) = E
v∗1 ,v2
i [e
∫ 1
0
r(Y (s),v∗
1
(Y (s−)),v2(s,Y (s−)))ds].
Let {Y˜n} be a Markov chain on some probability space (Ω˜, F˜ , P˜ ) with tran-
sition kernel P˜ (·, ·) and initial condition i ∈ S. We will denote the corre-
sponding expectation by E˜i[·].
Fix i ∈ S. Let {Y˜n} be the Markov chain given by (4.16) with Y˜0 = i. Set
τ˜ = inf{n ≥ 1|Y˜n = i} := τ˜1 and τ˜n+1 = inf{n ≥ τ˜n + 1|Y˜n = i}. Define
D(ρ) = E˜i[e
∑
τ˜
n=1
(rˆ(Y˜n)−ρ)].
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We state the following lemmas which play a crucial role in this section. Since
the proofs of these results closely mimic the corresponding proofs in [8], we
omit the details.
Lemma 4.5. Assume (A1) and ‖r‖∞ < δ. Then
D(ρ) ≤ 1.(4.17)
Lemma 4.6. Assume (A1). Then for each i ∈ S such that W (i) ≥ 1+ be
3δ
2
e
δ
2−1
,
E˜i[e
δτ˜/2] ≤ e−δ/2(W (i) + be3δ/2),
where δ > 0 is given in (A1).
Define C0 = {i ∈ S : W (i) ≥ 1 +
be
3δ
2
e
δ
2−1
}. Now we state and prove the
main theorem.
Theorem 4.4. Assume (A1) and ‖r‖∞ <
δ
2 , where δ > 0 is given in (A1).
Let (ρ, ψˆ(i)) be the solution obtained in Theorem 4.3. Then
ρ = inf
v1(·)∈M1
sup
v2(·)∈M2
lim sup
T→∞
1
T
lnEv1,v2i
[
e
∫
T
0
r(Y (s),v1(s,Y (s−)),v2(s,Y (s−)))ds
]
= sup
v2(·)∈M2
inf
v1(·)∈M1
lim sup
T→∞
1
T
lnEv1,v2i
[
e
∫
T
0
r(Y (s),v1(s,Y (s−)),v2(s,Y (s−)))ds
]
,
i.e., ρ is the value of the risk-sensitive ergodic game. Furthermore there
exists a pair of saddle point stationary Markov strategies (v∗1 , v
∗
2) such that
v∗1 is the outer minimizing selector in (4.3), and v
∗
2 is the outer maximizing
selector in (4.3).
Proof. In view of Theorem 4.3, it remains to show that
ρ ≥ inf
v1(·)∈M1
sup
v2(·)∈M2
lim sup
T→∞
1
T
lnEv1,v2i
[
e
∫
T
0
r(Y (s),v1(s,Y (s−)),v2(s,Y (s−)))ds
]
,
and the existence of a pair of saddle point stationary Markov strategies
(v∗1 , v
∗
2) such that v
∗
1 is the outer minimizing selector in (4.3), and v
∗
2 is the
outer maximizing selector in (4.3).
Fix an i ∈ C0 and N ∈ N, define
eBN (i) = E˜i
[
exp{
N∧τ˜∑
k=1
(rˆ(Y˜k)− ρ)}
]
for N ∈ N.
Arguing as in the proof of [[8], Theorem 3.5], it follows that
eBN+k(i) ≥ E˜i
[
exp{
k∑
m=1
(rˆ(Y˜m)− ρ)−N(‖rˆ‖∞ + ρ)}
]
.
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From Lemma 4.6, it follows that for each i ∈ C0, e
BN (i) ≤ e−δ/2(W (i) +
be3δ/2). Therefore taking logarithm in both sides and letting k →∞ we get
lim sup
k
1
k
ln E˜i
[
exp{
k−1∑
m=0
rˆ(Y˜m)}
]
≤ ρ.
By using mathematical induction, we show that ∀k ∈ N
E
v∗1 ,v2
i
[
exp{
∫ k
0
r(Y (s), v∗1(Y (s−)), v2(s, Y (s−)))ds}
]
= E˜i
[
exp{
k−1∑
i=0
rˆ(Y˜i)}
]
.
That is true for k = 1, by definition. Let this be true for k = n. Then for
k = n+ 1
E˜i
[
exp{
n∑
i=0
rˆ(Y˜i)}
]
= E˜i
[
exp{rˆ(i)}E˜Y˜1 [exp{
n−1∑
i=0
rˆ(Y˜i)}]
]
= E˜i
[
exp{rˆ(i)}EY˜1
[
exp{
∫ n
0
r(Y (s), v∗1(Y (s−)), v2(s, Y (s−)))ds}
]]
= E
v∗1 ,v2
i
[
exp{
∫ 1
0
r(Y (s), v∗1(Y (s−)), v2(s, Y (s−)))ds}
E
v∗1 ,v2
Y (1)
[
exp{
∫ n
0
r(Y (s), v∗1(Y (s−)), v2(s, Y (s−))))ds}
]]
= E
v∗
1
,v2
i
[
exp{
∫ n+1
0
r(Y (s), v∗1(Y (s−)), v2(s, Y (s−)))ds}
]
.
Hence we get
ρ ≥ lim sup
T→∞
1
T
lnE
v∗
1
,v2
i
[
e
∫
T
0
r(Y (s),v∗1 (Y (s−)),v2(s,Y (s−)))ds
]
, i ∈ C0.
Since v2 ∈ M2 is arbitrary, it follows that
ρ ≥ sup
v2∈M2
lim sup
T→∞
1
T
lnE
v∗
1
,v2
i
[
e
∫
T
0
r(Y (s),v∗1(Y (s−)),v2(s,Y (s−)))ds
]
, i ∈ C0.
Therefore we have
ρ ≥ inf
v1∈M1
sup
v2∈M2
lim sup
T→∞
1
T
lnE
v∗
1
,v2
i
[
e
∫
T
0
r(Y (s),v∗1 (Y (s−)),v2(s,Y (s−)))ds
]
, i ∈ C0.
Thus
ρ = lim sup
T→∞
1
T
lnE
v∗1 ,v
∗
2
i
[
e
∫
T
0
r(Y (s),v∗
1
(Y (s−)),v∗
2
(Y (s−)))ds
]
, i ∈ C0.
Arguing as in the proof of [[8], Theorem 3.5], it follows that the above
equation holds for all i ∈ S, i.e.,
ρ = lim sup
T→∞
1
T
lnE
v∗1 ,v
∗
2
i
[
e
∫
T
0
r(Y (s),v∗
1
(Y (s−)),v∗
2
(Y (s−)))ds
]
, i ∈ S.
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It is easy to check that ρ is the value of the risk-sensitive ergodic game.
Moreover, the pair of stationary Markov strategies (v∗1 , v
∗
2) where v
∗
1 is the
outer minimizing selector in (4.3), v∗2 is the outer maximizing selector in
(4.3) forms a saddle point equilibrium. This completes the proof. 
5. Conclusions
We have studied zero-sum risk-sensitive stochastic games for continuous
time Markov chains on a countable state space. For the ergodic case we
have taken the risk sensitive parameter θ = 1 for the sake of simplicity. If
we choose any other θ ∈ (0,Θ), then the assumption in Theorem 4.4 has to
be modified to θ‖r‖∞ <
δ
2
. This is the so called small cost criterion which is
standard in the literature [1], [2], [5], [8]. The corresponding non-zero sum
case is currently under investigation.
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